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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
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Title: The Effect of Managerial Reputation on Corporate Tax Avoidance 
 
Prior literature suggests that tax avoidance is an effective way to enhance firm 
value. However, there appears to be considerable cross-sectional variation in tax 
avoidance, and it is not clear why some firms do not take full advantage of the tax 
avoidance opportunities being used by others.  This study examines whether managerial 
reputation, as proxied by high-profile awards to top managers, is helpful in explaining 
corporate tax avoidance.  The empirical results show that, relative to a matched control 
group, firms managed by a celebrity manager have significantly higher cash and GAAP 
effective tax rates in the three year period following the manager’s first award than 
preceding the award.  This result is consistent with the conjecture that celebrity managers, 
for fear of being labeled as “poor citizens,” engage in less tax avoidance once they have 
an established reputation. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Prior studies on tax avoidance document that tax avoidance is an effective way to 
increase after-tax earnings and enhance firm value (e.g., Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 
2008).
1
  While empirical evidence suggests that tax avoidance strategies are abundant and 
pervasive, the literature documents significant variation in tax avoidance across firms.  
However, there is still little understanding of why some firms do not take full advantage 
of the tax avoidance opportunities being used by others (Shackelford and Shevlin 2001; 
Hanlon and Heitzman 2010).  In this study, using high-profile awards to managers as a 
proxy for managerial reputation, I examine whether managerial reputation helps explain 
firms’ tax avoidance.  Specifically, I analyze changes in the level of tax avoidance before 
and after celebrity managers win their first high-profile award sponsored by a major 
business publication such as Business Week, Forbes, Fortune, or Time. 
Taxes represent a significant cost to the company and a reduction in shareholders’ 
wealth since companies, on average, pay over one-third of their pre-tax profits in tax 
(Chen et al. 2010).  Given the significance of this tax cost to the firm and shareholders, 
managing taxes is an important part of the job of senior managers (e.g., Chief Executive 
Officer, Chief Financial Officer, and other top executives).  Shareholders expect 
managers to focus on profit maximization.  This may include tax avoidance, which can 
lead to a wealth transfer from the government to shareholders.  Therefore, if managers’ 
interest is perfectly aligned with shareholders’ interests, managers have incentive to 
                                                 
1
 Following prior literature, I define tax avoidance “broadly to encompass anything that reduces the firm’s 
taxes relative to its pre-tax accounting income (Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 2010).” Therefore, tax 
avoidance captures “both certain tax positions (e.g., municipal bond investments) as well as uncertain tax 
positions that may or may not be challenged and determined illegal (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010).” 
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reduce tax liabilities as long as the expected incremental benefit exceeds the incremental 
cost.  However, Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2010) find that the level of corporate tax 
avoidance significantly varies among individual managers.  Given the pervasiveness of 
tax avoidance strategies, this finding suggests that the incremental net benefits of tax 
avoidance, defined as the incremental benefits minus the incremental costs of tax 
avoidance, differ across individual managers. 
Anecdotal evidence often suggests that managers’ reputation concerns are a factor 
that limits tax avoidance.  For example, as described in Hanlon and Slemrod (2009), 
some firms invoke a “Wall Street Journal” test in their decision-making regarding tax 
avoidance (e.g., would it look unsavory if the company and its manager were reported on 
the front page of the Wall Street Journal for its tax avoidance?).  In addition, a recent 
controversy on General Electric’s legal but aggressive tax avoidance strategies has drawn 
substantial public attention.  The New York Times criticized Jeffrey R. Immelt, the CEO 
of G.E., for paying no taxes but claiming a tax benefit of $3.2 billion even though G.E. 
reported $5.1 billion in profits coming from its operations in the United States in 2010.
2
  
Presumably in fear of being labeled a “poor corporate citizen,” G.E. immediately 
responded by stating that the New York Times erroneously suggested the company made 
use of tax loopholes or innovative accounting.
3
 
Similarly, in their survey of tax executives, Graham, Hanlon, and Shevlin (2011) 
provides initial evidence on the managers’ reputation concern regarding tax avoidance.  
They find that 45 percent of executives agree that potential reputation damage is a “very 
important” factor in the decision of whether or not to implement a tax planning strategy.  
                                                 
2
 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/business/economy/25tax.html?_r=2 
 
3
 http://www.gereports.com/setting-the-record-straight-ge-and-taxes/ 
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They also show that more than one third of executives indicate that the risk of adverse 
media attention is very important in the decision-making process with respect to tax 
avoidance. 
In addition to the public backlash regarding lack of corporate citizenship, prior 
studies suggest tax avoidance may damage managerial reputation by incurring a 
“suspicion cost.”  Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) argue that investors interpret a firm's tax 
aggressiveness as evidence not only about a firm's behavior toward the tax authority, but 
also about its aggressiveness towards the investors.  For example, if investors suspect that 
a manager who is aggressive in tax planning is also aggressive in reporting accounting 
earnings, then the manager’s credibility on financial reporting may be seriously tarnished. 
Based on the above discussion, I expect managers’ reputation concern to play a 
role in their determination of the level of tax avoidance.  Accordingly, I hypothesize that 
celebrity managers who have more to lose in terms of their own human capital engage in 
less tax avoidance after receiving their first high-profile award than prior to the award. 
A major challenge in the managerial reputation literature is to create an empirical 
proxy for managers’ reputation.  This difficulty stems from the multi-dimensional nature 
of reputation.  In this study, I use high-profile awards as a proxy for managerial 
reputation.  Specifically, I exploit shifts in managerial reputation due to receipt of awards 
organized by major business publications.  Data on high-profile awards come from 
various publications: Business Week, Financial World, Chief Executive, Forbes, Fortune, 
Morningstar.com, Time, and Time/CNN.   
Following Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2010), I employ two standard measures 
for corporate tax avoidance: cash effective tax rate (CASH ETR: cash taxes paid divided 
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by pre-tax accounting income) and GAAP effective tax rate (GAAP ETR: total tax 
expense divided by pre-tax accounting income).  Prior research suggests that lower 
values of CASH ETR and GAAP ETR represent higher levels of tax avoidance (e.g., 
Gupta and Newberry 1997; Rego 2003; Chen et al 2010; Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 
2010). 
In an ideal empirical experiment, I would compare the change in tax avoidance of 
an award winner’s firm to the same firm’s change in tax avoidance had the manager not 
won the award (Malmendier and Tate 2009).  However, since the counterfactual 
observation is not available, it is necessary to find an empirical proxy for the hypothetical 
change in tax avoidance without the reputation increase.  Therefore, I construct a control 
sample of non-celebrity managers who are predicted to win awards.  I refer to this 
nearest-neighbor matched sample as “predicted winners.”  These managers are chosen 
based on the similarity of their firms’ economic condition and performance to those of 
firms managed by celebrity managers in the year of award.  Then, to investigate the 
impact of managerial reputation on tax avoidance, I use a differences-in-differences 
design, which compares differences in changes of tax avoidance for the firms managed 
by celebrity managers to their matched control firms before and after each celebrity 
manager (or predicted winner) wins (or is predicted to win) their first high-profile award.  
I find that, relative to firms managed by predicted winners, firms managed by 
celebrity managers have significantly higher CASH ETR and GAAP ETR in the three year 
period following their first award than in the three year period preceding the award.  This 
result suggests that celebrity managers engage in less tax avoidance once they have an 
established reputation.  In addition, I also find that, in the pre-award period, the level of 
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tax avoidance in firms managed by celebrity managers is not significantly different than 
the level of tax avoidance in firms managed by predicted winners.  This finding suggests 
that the decreased tax avoidance in the post-award period is not likely explained by a 
mean reversion explanation in which celebrity mangers may become conservative after 
receiving the award because they engaged in a higher level of tax avoidance prior to the 
award compared to predicted winners. 
My paper contributes to the literature in the following ways.  First, this study 
contributes to literature on tax avoidance by providing evidence that managerial 
reputation helps explain corporate tax avoidance.  While prior literature documents 
considerable variation in tax avoidance across firms, the literature does not adequately 
explain this variation by addressing the question as to why some firms forgo tax 
avoidance opportunities while others engage in it enthusiastically.  My results provide 
evidence that celebrity managers engage in less tax avoidance once they have an 
established reputation, suggesting managers’ reputation concern is one of the factors that 
limit tax avoidance activities. 
  Second, this study extends Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2010) by explicitly 
linking managerial reputation to corporate tax avoidance.  Whereas prior studies largely 
ignore the role of manager-specific attributes on tax avoidance, Dyreng, Hanlon, and 
Maydew (2010) find that individual executives have incremental effects on their firms’ 
tax avoidance that cannot be explained by firm characteristics.  However, to date the 
literature has been unable to identify any specific managerial attributes that affect 
corporate tax avoidance.  By considering a managerial human capital dimension (i.e., 
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reputation) in explaining corporate tax avoidance, this study complements Dyreng, 
Hanlon, and Maydew (2010). 
Finally, this study contributes to the literature on the reputation effect of business 
stakeholders, which suggests that the actions of business stakeholders are affected by 
reputation concerns.  Prior studies (Becker et al. 1998; Fang and Yasuda 2009) argue that 
the reputation of business stakeholders (e.g., auditors and financial analysts) serves to 
encourage worker discipline.  While these studies illuminate a bright side of the 
reputation effect, my results show that celebrity managers act in opportunistic ways that 
are possibly detrimental to firm value in order to preserve their personal reputation during 
their tax planning activities. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter II develops the hypothesis 
and discusses the related literature.  Chapter III presents the data and research design, and 
Chapter IV presents the empirical result of the main test.  Chapter V includes sensitivity 
analyses. Chapter VI concludes. 
  
 7 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
PRIOR RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Literature on Reputation Effect 
"The reputation of a thousand years may be determined by the conduct of one hour." 
4
 
-  Japanese proverb 
Maintaining a good reputation is an important incentive for business stakeholders 
in their decision-making.  Klewes and Wreschniok (2010) argue that reputation is one of 
the most valuable forms of a player’s "capital" because a good reputation gives rise to a 
sustainable competitive advantage for players (Bharadwaj, Varadarajan, and Fahy 1993).  
Consistent with this argument, a long-standing literature documents the impact of 
reputation on a player’s behavior (the so called “reputation effect”).  
For example, prior research on financial analysts suggests that the actions of 
professionals are affected by reputation concerns.  Clarke et al. (2007) find that superstar 
analysts who are top-ranked on the Institutional Investor All-American surveys do not 
change their recommendation levels when they change jobs, consistent with these 
analysts resisting pressures from investment bankers in order to protect their reputation.  
Fang and Yasuda (2009) find that superstar analysts make more accurate and less 
positively biased forecasts than other analysts when aggregate underwriting volume in 
the equity new issues market is high, suggesting that analysts’ reputation play as a 
disciplinary mechanism even when pressure to provide optimistic forecasts is high. 
                                                 
4
 This Japanese proverb is quoted in former Ohio State coach Jim Tressel’s book, The Winners Manual for 
The Game of Life (p. 193). It became an ironic inclusion, since his reputation was later tarnished after he 
was caught breaking NCAA (National Collegiate Athletic Association) rules. 
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The auditing literature also finds that reputation is important to auditors, and 
auditors take actions to protect their reputations.  Specifically, compared to non-Big N 
auditors, Big N auditors, who have more reputation capital, (1) allow less income-
increasing earnings management via discretionary accruals (Becker et al. 1998), (2) are 
more conservative with respect to financial reporting uncertainties (Francis and Krishnan 
1999), and (3) are less likely to allow their clients to have overstatement errors or 
irregularities (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1991). 
The reputation effect is also evident in the literature on top executive managers.  
Baik et al. (2011) find that celebrity managers who have been cited more in the press 
provide more frequent and accurate management earnings forecasts.  Moreover, the 
authors find that the market is more responsive to forecasts associated with these 
celebrity managers.  Francis et al. (2008) argue that firms with poor innate earnings 
quality are more likely to hire reputed managers, proxied by media citation counts, 
because reputed managers are better able to manage these firms than are managers with 
little or no reputation.  
While these studies illuminate a bright side of the reputation effect, Hayward and 
Hambrick (1997) show that celebrity managers who gain greater praise in the press are 
more likely to make inefficient investments (e.g., they pay higher acquisition premiums).  
Malmendier and Tate (2009) also argue that superstar managers overemphasize their 
personal career enhancements by spending more time on activities outside their 
companies, such as writing books or joining outside boards, which deteriorate firm 
performance. 
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Literature on Tax Avoidance 
Companies, on average, pay over one-third of their pre-tax profits in tax (Chen et 
al. 2010).  Given the significance of this tax cost to the firm, tax avoidance is possibly 
one way to effectively increase after-tax earnings and enhance firm value, ceteris 
paribus.  However, prior studies reveal considerable variation in tax avoidance across 
firms.  For example, Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2008) find that one-fourth of their 
sample firms are able to persistently maintain their tax payments below 20 percent of 
their pre-tax earnings over time horizons of up to ten years while another one-fourth of 
firms pay taxes more than 35 percent of their pre-tax earnings over periods as long as ten 
years.   
A question that spurs tax researchers’ curiosity is why some firms abandon tax 
avoidance opportunities whereas others engage in it enthusiastically (Shackelford and 
Shevlin 2001; Weisbach 2002).  In response to this puzzle, a substantial body of research 
has been dedicated to understanding the determinants of variation in tax avoidance.  
However, the literature to date does not adequately explain this variation.  For example, 
in their review of tax research, Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) point out that the literature 
focused on firm-level characteristics does not explain a substantial part of the variation in 
tax avoidance, and they call for more research on tax avoidance beyond firm-level 
determinants.   
A recent study by Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2010) casts some light on this 
issue by incorporating individual managers’ effect into the analysis of corporate tax 
avoidance.  They construct a data set that tracks the movement of managers across firms 
over time and find that individual managers have incremental and economically 
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significant effects on their firms’ tax avoidance beyond firm-level determinants.5  This 
finding has two important implications.  First, although the typical top manager is almost 
never a tax expert, a manager can affect corporate tax avoidance by setting the “tone at 
the top” with regard to the firm’s tax activities.6  Second, the net costs of tax avoidance 
differ across individual managers. 
Managers’ concern on reputational costs has often been conjectured to be a factor 
that partially explains why some firms abandon tax avoidance opportunities.  However, 
there is little hard empirical evidence about managers’ reputation concern on tax 
avoidance.  To date, the studies that come closest to addressing this are Graham, Hanlon, 
and Shevlin (2011) and Hanlon and Slemrod (2009).  In their survey of tax executives, 
Graham, Hanlon, and Shevlin (2011) provides initial evidence on the managers’ 
reputation concern regarding tax avoidance.  Graham, Hanlon, and Shevlin (2011) ask 
executives “what factors were important in your company’s decision not to implement 
the tax planning strategy?”  They find that 69.4 percent of executives agree that potential 
reputation damage is an “important” factor in their decision-making process (with 45.4 
percent rating this “very important”).  In addition, 57.6 percent of executives indicate that 
the risk of adverse media attention is important (with 37 percent rating this “very 
important”).  
                                                 
5
 Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2010), after establishing this idiosyncratic manager effect, try to identify 
common characteristics that can explain the manager-specific tax avoidance.  For example, they investigate 
whether managers’ biographical information (e.g., education, functional career track, sex and age) explains 
the variation in their tendencies toward tax avoidance.  However, they find little connection between 
biographic background and tax avoidance. 
 
6
 For example, managers may determine (1) what functional areas of the firm (e.g., sales, marketing, 
operations, tax) to focus on, and (2) how much of the firm’s resources to allocate to hiring different 
advisors both within and without the firm (e.g., strategy consultant, tax consultant) (Dyreng, Hanlon, and 
Maydew 2010).  In addition, top managers may set the compensation incentives of the tax director (Crocker 
and Slemrod 2005; Armstrong, Blouin, and Larcker 2009). 
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Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) examine the stock price reaction to news about tax 
aggressiveness.  They find that, on average, a company’s stock price declines when news 
about tax shelter involvement is released in the press.  They also find that the stock price 
decline is more negative for retail firms that deal directly with consumers, presumably 
due to a consumer/taxpayer reaction to perceptions of their being “bad” corporate 
citizens.  These findings suggest that the reputational consequence of tax avoidance 
activities is a phenomenon that exists in the market. 
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that managers are concerned about being 
perceived as “poor” citizens that do not pay the “fair share” of taxes.  For example, as 
mentioned above, a recent controversy on General Electric’s legal but aggressive tax 
avoidance strategies has drawn substantial public attention.  Even though G.E. reported 
$5.1 billion in profits coming from its operations in the United States in 2010, it claimed 
a tax benefit of $3.2 billion.  Critics say that the assertive tax avoidance of G.E. not only 
shortchanges the Treasury but also harms the economy by discouraging investment and 
hiring in the United States.  In the New York Times, Prestowitz (2011) criticizes Jeffrey 
R. Immelt, the CEO of G.E., for his aggressive tax planning by pointing out that the 
corporation is not chartered by the shareholders, but by the state.  He argues that “the 
state charters corporations because it believes they may provide benefits to the society 
and not just to the shareholders.”   Presumably in the fear of being labeled a “poor 
corporate citizen,” G.E. immediately responded by stating (1) that the company had been 
one of the highest payers of corporate income taxes over the past 10 years, (2) the 
company’s tax rate will be higher in 2011, (3) the company has contributed to society by 
creating more than 6,300 new U.S. manufacturing jobs since 2009,  and (4) that the New 
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York Times erroneously suggested the company made use of tax loopholes or innovative 
accounting.
7
 
Hypothesis 
Managerial reputation refers to the public perception about a manager’s 
competence, credibility, charisma, integrity, honesty, and vision (Francis et al. 2008).  
Wilson (1985) asserts that a player with established reputation “has an incentive to trade 
off the immediate consequences of his current decision against the long-term effects on 
his reputation.”  As a result, players’ focus on long-term effects can affect their decision-
making because they may restrain themselves from engaging in activities that potentially 
damage their own reputation.  Therefore, in order to preserve their reputation, celebrity 
managers who already possess a good reputation may behave differently from non-
celebrity managers who do not yet have strong reputations. 
I conjecture that managers’ reputation concern extends to their tax planning 
activities and therefore that celebrity managers may have greater reputation concern than 
non-celebrity managers for the following reasons.  First, once a manager has an 
established reputation, he or she may face greater “suspicion cost.”  Bosch and Eckard 
(1991) address the possibility that investors interpret one case of aggressiveness as 
evidence about a manager’s willingness to be aggressive towards everyone.  For example, 
investors may interpret a firm's tax aggressiveness as evidence not only about the firm's 
behavior toward the IRS, but also about its aggressiveness towards the investors (Hanlon 
and Slemord 2009).  If shareholders suspect that managers who are aggressive with the 
IRS are also aggressive in their other financial reporting, then the market will lose 
                                                 
7
 G.E. also responds by increasing their effective tax rate approximately four times in the next year from 7% 
to 28%. 
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confidence in the accuracy of the company's overall financial reporting.  Since 
shareholders maintain higher expectations toward celebrity managers in their overall 
financial reporting quality
8
, celebrity managers face higher suspicion cost from their 
aggressive tax planning.  
Second, once a manager has an established reputation, the reputation damage 
resulting from aggressive tax planning arises more “broadly” than before.  For example, 
in addition to illegal tax planning activities (e.g., noncompliance), tax planning activities 
that are legal as well as those that may fall into a gray area can potentially damage 
celebrity managers’ reputations.  Given the increased media exposure and public 
scrutiny, if their legal but aggressive tax planning activities are perceived as tax 
avoidance, celebrity managers are more subject to the reputational and political cost of 
being labeled as “poor citizens.”  Thus, once a manager has an established reputation, 
celebrity managers have less incentive to use their tax department as a profit center 
within their company.  As such, celebrity managers, after receiving their first high-profile 
award, are expected to engage in less tax avoidance to protect their human capital in the 
executive labor market.  Therefore, my hypothesis is as follows (stated in alternative 
form): 
H: Celebrity managers engage in less tax avoidance after receiving their first 
high-profile award than prior to the award. 
 
  
                                                 
8
 Users of financial statements consider the external reputation of top management to be a key factor in 
assessing the quality of financial reporting (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants Special 
Committee on Financial Reporting 1994). 
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CHAPTER III 
DATA AND REASEARCH DESIGN 
Proxy for Managerial Reputation 
A major challenge in the managerial reputation literature is to create an empirical 
proxy for managers’ reputation.  This difficulty arises from the multi-dimensional nature 
of reputation.  Prior studies on the effects of managerial reputation (Rajgopal, Shevlin, 
and Zamora 2006; Francis et al. 2008; Baik et al. 2010) measure managerial reputation by 
the number of press articles containing the manager’s name.  However, measurement 
error arises because press citation is more likely to measure how “prominent” the 
manager is rather than how “reputed” the manager is.  For example, Core, Guay, and 
Larcker (2008) report that more than 30% of articles on CEO compensation are in 
negative tone.  In addition, press coverage is biased toward firms and their managers with 
“more egregious and interesting frauds” (Miller 2006).  In this study, therefore, I use an 
alternative proxy that compensates for the bias in the prior studies: high-profile awards.  
Specifically, I exploit shifts in managers’ status due to manager awards conferred by 
major national media organizations.  Since winning high-profile awards is an external 
shock that explicitly enhances the visibility of a manager’s public reputation at a certain 
point in time, this measure allows me to test the conjectures regarding the implications of 
managerial reputation on tax avoidance using an event study method. 
In order to build a list of celebrity managers who have acquired a positive 
reputation from winning high-profile awards, I hand-collect data on prestigious awards 
given to managers from 1975 to 2007.  Various publications and organizations conferred 
high-profile awards on managers during my sample period: Business Week, Financial 
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World, Forbes, Fortune, Time, and Time/CNN.  To capture the clear shift in managerial 
reputation, I only consider each celebrity manager’s first award.  After merging this 
sample with available COMPUSTAT and Execucomp data, a total of 263 award winners 
are identified for the 1992–2007 period.  I also require that the managers serve their 
companies for three years before and three years after winning their first award in order 
to ensure that any changes in tax avoidance can be attributed to the celebrity managers.  
After imposing these restrictions and executing a sample matching procedure, my sample 
consists of 168 celebrity managers. 
Measuring Tax Avoidance 
Following Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2010), who study the effects of 
individual managers on tax avoidance, I define tax avoidance broadly to encompass 
“anything that reduces the firm’s taxes relative to its pre-tax accounting income,” 
including tax planning activities that may or may not be considered fraudulent tax 
reporting.  To keep my measures of tax avoidance broad and easily comprehensible, I 
employ the two standard measures used in Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2010).  The 
first is cash effective tax rate, which is the firm’s cash taxes paid divided by pre-tax 
accounting income (CASH ETR).
9
  The second measure is the firm’s effective tax rate as 
defined under GAAP (GAAP ETR), which is total tax expense (current plus deferred tax 
expense) divided by pre-tax accounting income.  While CASH ETR captures managers’ 
tax avoidance through both permanent and temporary book-tax differences, GAAP ETR 
captures permanent differences such as investments in tax havens and tax favored assets 
                                                 
9
 Effective tax rates with negative pre-tax income are set to missing.  The remaining non-missing effective 
tax rates are winsorized (reset) so that the largest observation is 1 and the smallest is 0. 
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(Chen et al. 2010).
10
  Prior research suggests that lower realization of CASH ETR and 
GAAP ETR represent higher levels of tax avoidance (e.g., Gupta and Newberry 1997; 
Rego 2003; Chen et al. 2010; Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 2010). 
Control Sample (Predicted Winners) 
In an ideal empirical experiment, I would compare the change in tax avoidance of 
an award winner’s firm to the same firm’s change in tax avoidance had the manager not 
won the award (Malmendier and Tate 2009).  However, since the counterfactual 
observation is not available, it is necessary to find an empirical proxy for the hypothetical 
change in tax avoidance without the reputation increase.  Therefore, I construct a control 
sample of non-celebrity managers who are predicted to win awards.  I refer to this 
nearest-neighbor matched sample as “predicted winners.”  These managers are chosen 
based on the similarity of their firms’ economic condition and performance to those of 
firms managed by celebrity managers in the year of their award.   
I construct the predicted winners sample in two steps.  First I run a logit 
regression to predict manager awards based on firm characteristics. 
 
WIN = β1 + β2SIZE + β3MB + β4ROA + β5RET + β6RETVOL + γIndustry Effects  
+ δYear Effects + ε        (1) 
 
WIN is an indicator variable coded as one for the year in which the manager of the 
company won the award, and zero otherwise.  SIZE is measured using the natural 
logarithm of total assets.  MB is the market-to-book ratio, measured as market value of 
equity scaled by book value of equity.  ROA is the return on assets, measured as income 
                                                 
10
 While CASH ETR reflects manager’s tax avoidance activities that reduce tax expense for financial 
accounting purposes, GAAP ETR reflects tax avoidance activities that reduce actual cash taxes paid. 
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before extraordinary items scaled by lagged total assets.  RET is the contemporaneous 12 
month return less value-weighted market return.  RETVOL is the standard deviation of the 
contemporaneous 12 month abnormal returns. 
I include SIZE and market-to-book ratio (MB) to account for similar pre-award 
economic condition.  Johnson, Young, and Welker (1993) find that both accounting and 
capital market measures of firm performance affect the likelihood of a manager to win an 
award.  Therefore, I include ROA to control for accounting performance and include the 
contemporaneous 12 month value-weighted adjusted returns (RET) and the standard 
deviation of the returns (RETVOL) to control for capital market performance.  I also 
include dummy variables for years and industries.  All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels.  Panel A of Table 1 presents the results 
of the logit regression.  Managers of larger firms with higher ROA and market returns are 
significantly more likely to win awards. 
Next, I use the predicted values from the logit regression (propensity scores) to 
construct the predicted winners sample for the award winners.  In each award year, I 
choose, with replacement, the non-winning managers with propensity scores closest to 
those of each actual award winners.  Panel B of Table 1 compares the characteristics 
between firms managed by celebrity managers and those managed by predicted winners.  
The observation that there are no differences in all five variables suggests that the 
predicted winners sample shares similar economic conditions and firm performance to 
the celebrity managers sample in the year in which the manager’s competence is 
assessed.  
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Tests of Hypothesis 
To investigate the impact of managerial reputation on tax avoidance, I use a 
differences-in-differences design, which compares differences in changes of tax 
avoidance for the firms managed by celebrity managers to their matched control firms 
before and after each celebrity manager (or predicted winner) wins (or is predicted to 
win) their first high-profile award.  Specifically, the regression equation I employ for my 
multivariate analysis takes the form: 
 
ETR = β1 + β2CELEBRITY + β3POST + β4CELEBRITY*POST + β5EBITDA  
+ β6SIZE + β7NOL + β8CNOL + β9LEV + β10FI + β11RD + β12SOTB  
+ β13CASH + β14ADV + β15SGA + β16PPE + β17INTAN + β18DEP  
+ β19EI + γYear Effects + ε               (2) 
 
ETR is CASH ETR (or GAAP ETR, each tested in separate regressions).  CELEBRITY is 
measured as an indicator variable coded as one for the celebrity managers and zero for 
the predicted winners.  POST is measured as an indicator variable coded as one for the 
post-award period and zero for the pre-award period.  EBITDA is earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation, and amortization scaled by lagged total assets.  SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of total assets.  NOL is an indicator variable coded as one if loss carry forward 
is positive as of the beginning of the year, and zero otherwise.  CNOL is the change in 
loss carry forward scaled by lagged total assets.  LEV, the leverage, is measured as long-
term debt scaled by lagged total assets.  FI is the foreign income scaled by lagged total 
assets; when missing, it is reset to zero.  RD is the research and development expense 
scaled by lagged total assets; when missing, it is reset to zero.  SOTB is the tax benefit of 
stock options scaled by lagged total assets.  CASH is cash holing scaled by lagged total 
 19 
 
 
assets.  ADV is the advertising expense scaled by net sales; when missing, it is reset to 
zero.  SGA is the selling, general, and administrative expense scaled by net sales; when 
missing, it is reset to zero.  PPE is the plant, property, and equipment scaled by lagged 
total assets.  INTAN is the intangible assets scaled by lagged total assets; when missing, it 
is reset to zero.  DEP is the depreciation and amortization expense scaled by lagged total 
assets.  EI is an indicator variable coded as one if equity income in earnings is present 
and does not equal zero, and zero otherwise.       
If celebrity managers engage in less tax avoidance, relative to predicted winners,  
after receiving their first high-profile award than prior to the award, I expect a positive 
coefficient on the interaction of CELEBRITY and POST, β4, when using both CASH ETR 
and GAAP ETR to capture tax avoidance.  I expect the opposite sign if celebrity managers 
engage in more tax avoidance after receiving their high-profile award than prior to the 
award.  
I control for firm characteristics that may affect tax avoidance as documented in 
the literature (e.g., Mills 1998; Manzon and Plesko 2002; Rego 2003; Dyreng, Hanlon, 
and Maydew 2008; Frank, Lynch, and Rego 2009; Chen et al. 2010; Dyreng, Hanlon, and 
Maydew 2010).  The first set of control variables captures a firm’s tax planning 
incentives and opportunities that are associated with economies of scale and firm 
complexity.  Accordingly, I control for firm profitability (EBITDA), firm size (SIZE), the 
presence of net operating loss carry forward (NOL), the change in loss carry forward 
(CNOL), leverage (LEV), income from foreign operations (FI), research and development 
activities (RD), tax benefit of stock options (SOTB), cash holding (CASH), advertising 
activities (ADV), and selling, general and administrative expense (SGA).  The second set 
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of control variables captures differences in financial and tax accounting treatment that 
can affect my tax avoidance measures.  I include the firm’s property, plant, and 
equipment assets (PPE), intangible assets (INTAN), depreciation and amortization 
expense (DEP), and equity in earnings (EI) in my regression.  I also include dummy 
variables for each year of the sample period.  All continuous variables are winsorized at 
the 1 percent and 99 percent levels, and standard errors are clustered by firm to account 
for serial correlation in the residuals. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of tax avoidance metrics and control 
variables, split into a celebrity managers sample (treatment group) and a predicted 
winners sample (matched control group) in the year in which the manager’s competence 
is assessed.  Table 2 also contains t-values for a test of the hypothesis that the difference 
between celebrity managers and predicted winners is zero.  The mean CASH ETR for 
celebrity managers is 23.3 percent while the mean value for predicted winners is 24.4 
percent.  The celebrity managers sample has a mean GAAP ETR of 33.8 percent, which is 
slightly higher than the mean value for the predicted winners sample (32.7 percent).  The 
observation that the differences of CASH ETR and GAAP ETR are not significantly 
different across two samples suggests that celebrity managers are not different than 
predicted winners with respect to their tax avoidance in the year in which the manager’s 
competence is assessed.  In addition, the finding that GAAP ETR is higher than CASH 
ETR is consistent with the findings in prior research that firms, on average, have higher 
pre-tax accounting income than taxable income. 
Multivariate Test 
I present the result of regression (2) in Table 3.  The result provides evidence 
consistent with my hypothesis.  The coefficients on the interaction of CELEBRITY and 
POST (CELEBRITY *POST) are significantly positive for both CASH ETR (0.027) and 
GAAP ETR (0.019).  This finding implies that, relative to firms managed by predicted 
winners, firms managed by celebrity managers have significantly higher CASH ETR and 
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GAAP ETR in the period of three years following their first award than in the period of 
three years preceding the award.  As such, celebrity managers engage in less tax 
avoidance once they have an established reputation. 
In addition, given the fact that mean pre-tax income is $1.9 billion, this result 
suggests that firms managed by celebrity managers, on average, pay $51 million more in 
cash taxes and recognize $36 million more in tax expenses in the post-award period than 
in the pre-award period, relative to firms managed by predicted winners. 
A concern with implications from the above finding is that celebrity managers 
may become conservative after receiving their first award because they engaged in a 
higher level of tax avoidance prior to the award compared to predicted winners.  In other 
words, the finding could be simply a form of mean reversion.  The coefficients on the 
dummy variable for the celebrity managers sample (CELEBRITY) address this question 
since these coefficients capture the differences of CASH ETR and GAAP ETR between 
the celebrity managers sample and the predicted winners sample in the pre-award period.  
Table 3 shows that β2s are insignificant for both CASH ETR and GAAP ETR.  This 
suggests that celebrity managers are not different than predicted winners in their tax 
avoidance in the pre-award period.  Therefore, it is unlikely that mean reversion drives 
the primary finding. 
Overall, the results in the multivariate test are consistent with my hypothesis that 
celebrity managers, in fear of being labeled as “poor citizens,” engage in less tax 
avoidance once they have an established reputation.          
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CHAPTER V 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimator 
The dependent variables used in this study are CASH ETR (the fraction of pre-tax 
accounting income paid as cash taxes) and GAAP ETR (the fraction of pre-tax accounting 
income recognized as tax expenses).  Although the prior studies on tax avoidance utilize 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to estimate the effect of covariates on effective 
tax rates (e.g., Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 2008; Chen et al. 2010; Dyreng, Hanlon, 
and Maydew 2010), a potential concern with such an approach is that the nature of 
fractional dependent variables possibly violates several assumptions underlying the OLS 
estimation.  First, proportional variables are not normally distributed because they are not 
defined over the domain of the normal distribution (Smith and Fernandez 2010).  Second, 
due to the bounded nature of the interval, the variance can be heteroscedastic (Kieschnick 
and McCullough 2003).  Finally, the OLS regression is likely to predict values outside 
the [0,1] interval because theoretically the predicted values from the OLS regression can 
range from negative infinity to positive infinity (Qi and Zhao 2011).  
To address this issue, I introduce a quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (QMLE) 
based on the fractional response model proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996).  The 
conditional expectation of the fractional response model can be written as follows. 
 
 ( | )   (  )  
 
      (   )
       (3) 
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G(.) is the cumulative normal distribution, which satisfies 0 < G(z) < 1 for all z   ℝ.  The 
nonlinear estimation procedure consists of the maximization of the Bernoulli log-
likelihood function (Papke and Wooldridge 1996). 
 
  ( ̂)       [ (   ̂)]  (    )    [   (   ̂)]    (4) 
 
The quasi-maximum likelihood estimator of β is consistent and asymptotically normal 
regardless of the distribution of yi conditional on xi (Gourieroux et al 1984).   
 Table 4 presents the regression results of the fractional response model.  The 
coefficients on the interaction of CELEBRITY and POST (CELEBRITY *POST) are 
significantly positive for both CASH ETR and GAAP ETR, implying that celebrity 
managers engage in less tax avoidance, relative to predicted winners,  after receiving 
their first high-profile award.  The finding of insignificant coefficients on the dummy 
variable for the celebrity managers sample (CELEBRITY) assures that the primary finding 
is not driven by the mean reversion explanation.  Overall, the results in Table 4 are 
consistent with my hypothesis, and overall inferences are consistent with the findings 
presented in Chapter IV. 
Pre-tax Earnings and Implicit Taxes 
The results in Chapter IV show that, relative to a control group, firms managed by 
celebrity managers have higher CASH ETR and GAAP ETR in the post-award period.  
This suggests that celebrity managers engage in less tax avoidance with respect to 
explicit taxes (i.e., taxes paid to the taxing authorities) subsequent to the award-winning.  
However, a concern about using this result to make inferences about tax avoidance is that 
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ETR measures do not directly capture implicit taxes.
11, 12
  It is possible that the increased 
CASH ETR and GAAP ETR may result from celebrity managers’ change in their 
investment portfolio.  For example, subsequent to the award-winning, celebrity managers 
may invest more on tax-disfavored assets and less on tax-favored assets, thereby bearing 
less implicit taxes; this may lead to an increase in pre-tax rates of return.  Therefore, I 
investigate whether firms managed by celebrity managers experience an increase in their 
pre-tax rates of return after receiving their first high-profile award than prior to the award.  
Specifically, I estimate the following regression: 
 
BTROA = β1 + β2CELEBRITY + β3POST + β4CELEBRITY*POST + β5SIZE  
                + β6GROWTH + β7LEV + γIndustry Effects + δYear Effects + ε                   (5) 
 
BTROA, the pre-tax rate of return on assets, is measured as pre-tax earnings scaled by 
lagged total assets.  SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets.  GROWTH, the growth 
opportunity, is measured as the ratio of research and development expenses to lagged 
total assets.  LEV, the leverage, is measured as long-term debt scaled by lagged total 
assets.  I include dummy variables for two-digit SIC codes and for each year of the 
sample period.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 percent and 99 percent 
levels, and standard errors are clustered by firm to account for serial correlation in the 
residuals.  
                                                 
11
 Scholes and Wolfson (1992) use the term ‘implicit taxes’ to describe the phenomenon where tax-favored 
assets bear lower pre-tax returns than tax-disfavored assets.  It is said that an investment in a tax-favored 
asset bears implicit taxes when the pre-tax returns are lower than the returns on a fully-taxed asset of 
identical risk (e.g., municipal bond investments). 
 
12
 ETR measures indirectly capture implicit taxes.  When the denominator of ETR (i.e., pre-tax accounting 
income) is lower for a given amount of tax, ETR is higher. 
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To the extent a higher pre-tax rate of return on assets signals decreased implicit 
tax costs, a positive coefficient on CELEBRITY*POST suggests that celebrity managers 
bear less implicit taxes, relative to predicted winners, subsequent to the award-winning.  
Alternatively, an insignificant coefficient suggests that there is no difference in the level 
of implicit taxes for firms managed by celebrity managers than for the control group 
following the award-winning. 
I present the result of regression (5) in Table 5.  The coefficient on CELEBRITY 
*POST is insignificant, implying that firms managed by celebrity managers experience 
no significant change in their pre-tax rate of return once their managers win a high-profile 
award.   
All Awards 
As discussed in Chapter III, I only include each celebrity manager’s first award in 
my sample, assuming the first award captures clearer shifts in managerial reputation.  
However, it is also reasonable to assume that any winning of an award subsequent to the 
first one has an incremental reputational effect.  Therefore, in this section I examine the 
managerial reputation effect on tax avoidance with a broader sample that includes all 
high-profile awards.  This release of restriction to the sample results in 278 awards.
13
  I 
construct a matched control group for this broader treatment group using the method 
described in Chapter III. 
Panel A of Table 6 provides the regression results of the OLS model, and Panel B 
of Table 6 presents the results of the fractional response model.  Across all four 
specifications, the coefficients on the interaction of CELEBRITY and POST (CELEBRITY 
                                                 
13
 I still require that the celebrity managers serve the company for three years before and three years after 
winning their high-profile award in order to ensure that any changes in tax avoidance can be attributed to 
the celebrity managers. 
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*POST) are positive and significant. This finding again provides support that celebrity 
managers become conservative in their tax planning activities after receiving high-profile 
awards. 
Overall, the results in this chapter suggest that the inferences drawn from the 
previous chapter are not subject to the misspecification issue and that the results are not 
sensitive to the inclusion of subsequent award-winnings for each celebrity manager. 
 28 
 
 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
The objective of this study is to investigate the impact of managerial reputation on 
corporate tax avoidance.  As managerial reputation is difficult to measure due to its 
multi-dimensional nature, I exploit the event of managers winning high-profile awards to 
proxy for managerial reputation.  Using a sample of 168 celebrity managers who win a 
high-profile award, I analyze the changes in the level of tax avoidance before and after 
each celebrity manager wins their first high-profile award.  The results show that 
celebrity managers engage in less tax avoidance after receiving their first award. 
While this study provides evidence consistent with that managerial reputation 
plays a role in corporate tax avoidance, it has limitations.  Since this study focuses on the 
increase in reputation around a specific level (i.e., the shift in reputation captured by 
winning awards), the result may be difficult to generalize to a continuum of reputation 
that lies outside of this level.  In addition, while I only consider prestigious high-profile 
awards in compiling my sample, different kinds of awards may shift the managers’ status 
and reputation to different extents.  In other words, given the heterogeneity of manager 
awards, reputation effect may vary among the awards. 
With this caveat in mind, my paper contributes to the literature in the following 
ways.  First, this study contributes to literature on tax avoidance by explicitly considering 
a managerial human capital dimension (i.e., reputation) in explaining corporate tax 
avoidance.  Second, this study contributes to the literature on the reputation effect of 
business stakeholders.  While prior research illuminates a bright side of the reputation 
effect, my results show that celebrity managers act in opportunistic ways possibly 
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detrimental to shareholder value in order to preserve their own reputation during their tax 
planning. 
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APPENDIX A 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
Effect of Managerial Reputation on Tax Avoidance (Table 2,3,4 and 6) 
Variable 
 
Description 
   CASH ETR  The cash effective tax rate, defined as cash tax paid divided by pre-tax book 
income 
GAAP ETR  The financial accounting tax rate, defined as total tax expenses divided by 
pre-tax book income 
CELEBRITY  Indicator variable coded as one for the celebrity managers and zero for 
the predicted winners 
POST  Indicator variable coded as one for the post-award period and zero for 
the pre-award period 
EBITDA  Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization scaled by 
lagged total assets 
SIZE  Natural logarithm of total assets 
NOL  Indicator variable coded as one if loss carry forward is positive as of the 
beginning of the year, and zero otherwise 
CNOL  Change in loss carry forward scaled by lagged total assets 
LEV  Long-term debt scaled by lagged total assets 
FI  Foreign income scaled by lagged total assets; when missing, it is reset to 
zero 
RD  Research and development expense scaled by lagged total assets; when 
missing, it is reset to zero 
SOTB  Tax benefit of stock options scaled by lagged total assets 
CASH  Cash holing scaled by lagged total assets 
ADV  Advertising expense scaled by net sales; when missing, it is reset to zero 
SGA  Selling, general, and administrative expense scaled by net sales; when 
missing, it is reset to zero 
PPE  Plant, property, and equipment scaled by lagged total assets 
INTAN  Intangible assets scaled by lagged total assets; when missing, it is reset 
to zero 
DEP  Depreciation and amortization expense scaled by lagged total assets 
EI   Indicator variable coded as one if equity income in earnings is present 
and does not equal zero, and zero otherwise 
    
 
  
 31 
 
 
Construction of Predicted Winners (Table 1) 
Variable 
 
Description 
   WIN  Indicator variable coded as one for the year in which the manager of 
the company won the award and zero otherwise 
SIZE  Natural logarithm of total assets 
MB  Market-to-book ratio, measured as market value of equity scaled by 
book value of equity 
ROA  Return on assets, measured as income before extraordinary items 
scaled by lagged total assets 
RET  Contemporaneous 12 month return less value-weighted market return 
RETVOL   Standard deviation of the contemporaneous 12 month abnormal 
returns 
   
 
Effect of Managerial Reputation on Pre-tax Earnings (Table 5) 
Variable 
 
Description 
   BTROA  Pre-tax earnings scaled by lagged total assets 
CELEBRITY  Indicator variable coded as one for the celebrity managers and zero for 
the predicted winners 
POST  Indicator variable coded as one for the post-award period and zero for 
the pre-award period 
SIZE  Natural logarithm of total assets 
GROWTH  Research and development expenses scaled by lagged total assets 
LEV   Long-term debt scaled by lagged total assets 
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APPENDIX B 
FIGURE 
Figure 1.  Effective Tax Rates Before and After an Award-Winning 
Panel A: Cash ETR 
 
 
 
Panel B: GAAP ETR 
 
 
 
This figure plots the effective tax rates for firms managed by celebrity managers and 
firms managed by predicted winners in event time aroud an award-winning.  Panel A 
presents the CASH ETR, defined as cash tax paid divided by pre-tax book income.  Panel 
B presents the GAAP ETR, defined as total tax expenses divided by pre-tax book income.  
Award year is the year in which the manager’s competence is assessed.  
20%
21%
22%
23%
24%
25%
26%
27%
Year
-2
Year
-1
Award
Year
Year
1
Year
2
Year
3
Cash ETR 
Celebrity Managers
Predicted Winners
29%
30%
31%
32%
33%
34%
35%
36%
Year
-2
Year
-1
Award
Year
Year
1
Year
2
Year
3
GAAP ETR 
Celebrity Managers
Predicted Winners
 33 
 
 
APPENDIX C 
TABLES 
Table 1.  Matched Control Sample (Predicted Winners) 
 
      Panel A: Predictiong Determinants of Award Winners 
 
        WIN = β1 + β2SIZE + β3MB + β4ROA + β5RET + β6RETVOL + γIndustry Effects  
                  + δYear Effects + ε         
  
 
  
Variable Coefficients  χ2-stat 
SIZE  0.792*** 289.165 
MB  0.088***   49.083 
ROA  3.268***   25.100 
RET  1.668***   40.598 
RETVOL -0.850     0.247 
   
Industry Dummies YES 
 
Year Dummies YES 
 
   
Observations 129,684 
 
Pseudo R
2
 0.292   
    
 
 
      Panel B: Differences between Celebrity Managers and Predicted Winners 
          
Variable  
Celebrity  
Managers 
Predicted 
Winners 
Difference (t-stat) 
SIZE   8.877   8.911   0.034    0.85 
MB   4.761   5.300   0.538    0.49 
ROA   0.119   0.114  -0.005   -0.77 
RET   0.169   0.171   0.003    0.07 
RETVOL   0.090   0.091   0.002    0.25 
      
WIN is an indicator variable coded as one for the year in which the manager of the 
company won the award, and zero otherwise.  All other variables are as defined in 
Appendix A.  Year and industry dummies are included in the specification.  * denotes 
significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level, and *** denotes 
significance at 1%.  
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Table 2.  Summary Statistics 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                  (Number of firm-year observations = 168) 
 
                          
              
  
Celebrity Managers 
 
Predicted Winners 
 
Differences in Means 
 
  Mean Std. dev.   Mean Std. dev.   Difference        t-stat   
 
EBITDA 0.183 0.117 
 
0.183 0.126 
  
 0.000 
  
 0.02 
 
 
SIZE 8.877 1.765 
 
8.911 1.922 
  
 0.034 
  
 0.85 
 
 
NOL 0.144 0.352 
 
0.185 0.389 
  
 0.041 
  
 1.01 
 
 
CNOL 0.011 0.120 
 
0.000 0.031 
  
-0.012 
  
-1.21 
 
 
LEV 0.214 0.293 
 
0.253 0.292 
  
 0.040 
  
 1.23 
 
 
FI 0.019 0.046 
 
0.021 0.046 
  
 0.002 
  
 0.43 
 
 
RD 0.038 0.070 
 
0.027 0.050 
  
-0.010 
  
-1.58 
 
 
SOTB 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
  
 0.000 
  
-0.22 
 
 
CASH 0.202 0.350 
 
0.119 0.173 
  
-0.083 
  
-2.73*** 
 
 
ADV 0.015 0.031 
 
0.016 0.041 
  
 0.001 
  
 0.17 
 
 
SGA 0.187 0.172 
 
0.174 0.158 
  
-0.013 
  
-0.70 
 
 
PPE 0.344 0.303 
 
0.377 0.312 
  
 0.033 
  
 0.98 
 
 
INTAN 0.088 0.169 
 
0.189 1.233 
  
 0.102 
  
 1.06 
 
 
DEP 0.049 0.044 
 
0.054 0.071 
  
 0.005 
  
 0.75 
 
 
EI 0.345 0.477 
 
0.375 0.486 
  
 0.030 
  
 0.57 
 
 
CASH ETR 0.233 0.174 
 
0.244 0.186 
  
 0.011 
  
 0.57 
 
 
GAAP ETR 0.338 0.078   0.327 0.120     -0.011     -0.98   
               
This table presents the descriptive statistics of tax avoidance metrics and control variables, split into a celebrity managers sample 
(treatment group) and a predicted winners sample (matched control group) in the year in which the manager’s competence is assessed.  
CASH ETR is cash taxes paid divided by pre-tax accounting income.  GAAP ETR is total tax expense divided by pre-tax accounting 
income.  Effective tax rates with negative pre-tax income are set to missing.  The remaining non-missing effective tax rates are winsorized 
(reset) so that the largest observation is 1 and the smallest is 0.  All other variables are as defined in Appendix A.  * denotes significance at 
10% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level, and *** denotes significance at 1%.  
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Table 3. First Awards (OLS Model)         
 
            
   Dependent variables 
       CASH ETR           GAAP ETR 
CELEBRITY -0.008 (-0.65) 
 
0.003 ( 0.29) 
POST 0.000 ( 0.00) 
 
0.003 ( 0.34) 
CELEBRITY*POST 0.027 ( 2.05)** 
 
0.019 ( 1.78)* 
EBITDA 0.029 ( 0.69)   
 
0.074 ( 1.26) 
SIZE 0.000 ( 0.00) 
 
0.003 ( 0.91) 
NOL 0.006 ( 0.65) 
 
0.005 ( 0.55) 
CNOL -0.053 (-0.83) 
 
0.059 ( 0.33) 
LEV 0.036 ( 1.37) 
 
0.004 ( 0.15) 
FI 0.177 ( 1.90)* 
 
-0.162 (-1.78)* 
RD 0.048 ( 0.62) 
 
-0.110 (-0.83) 
SOTB -0.208 (-0.56) 
 
0.043 ( 0.86) 
CASH -0.005 (-0.73) 
 
0.018 ( 1.57) 
ADV -0.108 (-0.83) 
 
0.129 ( 0.99) 
SGA 0.018 ( 0.98) 
 
-0.012 (-0.25) 
PPE -0.018 (-0.74) 
 
-0.034 (-1.40) 
INTAN 0.003 ( 0.22) 
 
0.031 ( 1.16) 
DEP 0.052 ( 0.28) 
 
0.095 ( 0.43) 
EI 0.020 ( 1.75)* 
 
-0.008 (-0.71) 
      
Year Dummies YES 
  
YES 
 
      Observations 1,726 
  
1,726 
 
Adj. R
2
 0.055     0.057   
       
This table presents the results of estimating an OLS model.  CASH ETR is cash taxes paid 
divided by pre-tax accounting income.  GAAP ETR is total tax expense divided by pre-tax 
accounting income.  CELEBRITY is an indicator variable coded as one for the celebrity 
managers and zero for the predicted winners.  POST is an indicator variable coded as one for the 
post-award period and zero for the pre-award period.  All other variables are as defined in 
Appendix A.  Year dummies are included in the specification.  Coefficients are presented with t-
statistics based on firm clustered standard errors in parenthesis. * denotes significance at 10% 
level, ** denotes significance at 5% level, and *** denotes significance at 1%, all for two-tailed 
tests.
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Table 4. First Awards (Fractional Response Model) 
    
            
   Dependent variables 
       CASH ETR           GAAP ETR 
CELEBRITY -0.046 (-0.66) 
 
0.013 ( 0.30) 
POST 0.001 ( 0.01) 
 
0.013 ( 0.34) 
CELEBRITY*POST 0.148 ( 2.05)** 
 
0.084 ( 1.81)* 
EBITDA 0.167 ( 0.72)   
 
0.328 ( 1.28) 
SIZE 0.000 (-0.01) 
 
0.012 ( 0.92) 
NOL 0.032 ( 0.66) 
 
0.022 ( 0.55) 
CNOL -0.270 (-0.80) 
 
0.260 ( 0.33) 
LEV 0.194 ( 1.43) 
 
0.014 ( 0.12) 
FI 0.953 ( 1.91)* 
 
-0.729 (-1.80)* 
RD 0.268 ( 0.64) 
 
-0.490 (-0.84) 
SOTB -1.202 (-0.59) 
 
0.208 ( 0.91) 
CASH -0.031 (-0.81) 
 
0.075 ( 1.59) 
ADV -0.565 (-0.80) 
 
0.569 ( 1.00) 
SGA 0.091 ( 1.04) 
 
-0.053 (-0.25) 
PPE -0.099 (-0.76) 
 
-0.153 (-1.42) 
INTAN 0.009 ( 0.13) 
 
0.141 ( 1.20) 
DEP 0.264 ( 0.26) 
 
0.437 ( 0.45) 
EI 0.111 ( 1.80)* 
 
-0.038 (-0.73) 
      
Year Dummies YES 
  
YES 
 
      Observations 1,726     1,726   
       
This table presents the results of estimating a fractional response model.  CASH ETR is cash 
taxes paid divided by pre-tax accounting income.  GAAP ETR is total tax expense divided by 
pre-tax accounting income.  CELEBRITY is an indicator variable coded as one for the celebrity 
managers and zero for the predicted winners.  POST is an indicator variable coded as one for the 
post-award period and zero for the pre-award period.  All other variables are as defined in 
Appendix A.  Year dummies are included in the specification.  Coefficients are presented with Z-
statistics based on firm clustered standard errors in parenthesis. * denotes significance at 10% 
level, ** denotes significance at 5% level, and *** denotes significance at 1%, all for two-tailed 
tests.
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Table 5. Pre-tax Earnings and Implicit Taxes 
 
      
Variable Coefficients t-stat 
CELEBRITY -0.003 -0.55 
POST  0.005  0.45 
CELEBRITY*POST  0.000  0.00 
SIZE -0.015*** -4.18 
GROWTH  0.146***  8.42 
LEV -0.241*** -7.40 
   Industry Dummies YES 
 
Year Dummies YES 
 
   N 1,967 
 
Adj. R
2
 0.240   
    
BTROA, the pre-tax rate of return on assets, is as pre-tax earnings scaled by lagged total 
assets.  CELEBRITY is an indicator variable coded as one for the celebrity managers and 
zero for the predicted winners.  POST is an indicator variable coded as one for the post-
award period and zero for the pre-award period.  SIZE is the natural logarithm of total 
assets.  GROWTH, the growth opportunity, is measured as the ratio of research and 
development expenses to lagged total assets.  LEV, the leverage, is measured as long-
term debt scaled by lagged total assets.  Year and industry dummies are included in the 
specification.  Coefficients are presented with t-statistics based on firm clustered standard 
errors in parenthesis. * denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5% 
level, and *** denotes significance at 1%, all for two-tailed tests.    
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Table 6. All Awards  
 
Panel A: OLS Model 
            
   Dependent variables 
       CASH ETR           GAAP ETR 
CELEBRITY 0.009 ( 0.79) 
 
0.006 ( 0.80) 
POST -0.002 (-0.16) 
 
-0.002 (-0.26) 
CELEBRITY*POST 0.020 ( 1.96)* 
 
0.011 ( 1.99)** 
EBITDA 0.016 ( 0.34)   
 
0.022 ( 0.71) 
SIZE 0.003 ( 0.93) 
 
0.003 ( 1.02) 
NOL -0.003 (-0.42) 
 
-0.010 (-1.75)* 
CNOL -0.026 (-1.13) 
 
-0.030 (-1.15) 
LEV -0.008 (-0.48) 
 
0.000 (-0.01) 
FI 0.119 ( 1.44) 
 
-0.064 (-1.16) 
RD 0.146 ( 1.83)* 
 
0.035 ( 0.58) 
SOTB -0.111 (-2.01)** 
 
0.014 ( 0.05) 
CASH -0.012 (-1.26) 
 
-0.003 (-0.76) 
ADV 0.113 ( 0.66) 
 
0.106 ( 1.72)* 
SGA -0.019 (-0.83) 
 
-0.004 (-0.34) 
PPE 0.026 ( 1.21) 
 
-0.001 (-0.07) 
INTAN 0.036 ( 1.33) 
 
0.001 ( 0.05) 
DEP 0.116 ( 0.66) 
 
0.009 ( 0.08) 
EI -0.005 (-0.52) 
 
0.001 ( 0.09) 
      
Year Dummies YES 
  
YES 
 
      Observations 2,940 
  
2,940 
 
Adj. R
2
 0.044     0.033   
      This table presents the results of estimating an OLS model.  CASH ETR is cash taxes paid 
divided by pre-tax accounting income.  GAAP ETR is total tax expense divided by pre-tax 
accounting income.  All other variables are as defined in Appendix A.  Year dummies are 
included in the specification.  Coefficients are presented with t-statistics based on firm clustered 
standard errors in parenthesis. * denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5% 
level, and *** denotes significance at 1%, all for two-tailed tests. 
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Table 6 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Fractional Response Model   
            
  Dependent variables 
       CASH ETR           GAAP ETR 
CELEBRITY 0.053 ( 0.78) 
 
0.026 ( 0.81) 
POST -0.010 (-0.15) 
 
-0.007 (-0.27) 
CELEBRITY*POST 0.110 ( 1.86)* 
 
0.049 ( 1.99)** 
EBITDA 0.096 ( 0.35)   
 
0.098 ( 0.71) 
SIZE 0.018 ( 0.91) 
 
0.013 ( 1.03) 
NOL -0.020 (-0.43) 
 
-0.045 (-1.76)* 
CNOL -0.159 (-1.08) 
 
-0.141 (-1.10) 
LEV -0.045 (-0.43) 
 
-0.001 (-0.02) 
FI 0.676 ( 1.48) 
 
-0.291 (-1.17) 
RD 0.811 ( 1.90)* 
 
0.154 ( 0.59) 
SOTB -0.637 (-1.97)** 
 
0.092 ( 0.08) 
CASH -0.066 (-1.22) 
 
-0.015 (-0.76) 
ADV 0.660 ( 0.68) 
 
0.479 ( 1.74)* 
SGA -0.118 (-0.70) 
 
-0.016 (-0.33) 
PPE 0.146 ( 1.20) 
 
-0.003 (-0.07) 
INTAN 0.194 ( 1.37) 
 
0.003 ( 0.06) 
DEP 0.664 ( 0.69) 
 
0.044 ( 0.08) 
EI -0.029 (-0.48) 
 
0.003 ( 0.09) 
      
Year Dummies YES 
  
YES 
 
      Observations 2,940     2,940   
       
This table presents the results of estimating a fractional response model.  CASH ETR is cash 
taxes paid divided by pre-tax accounting income.  GAAP ETR is total tax expense divided by 
pre-tax accounting income.  All other variables are as defined in Appendix A.  Year dummies are 
included in the specification.  Coefficients are presented with Z-statistics based on firm clustered 
standard errors in parenthesis. * denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5% 
level and *** denotes significance at 1%, all for two-tailed tests. 
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